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Toward a Theory of Motion Practice and Settlement
Comment
by
A. C. Pritchard*
1 Introduction
Scott Baker (2017) has provided a thought-provoking contribution to this sym-
posium volume, helping us to better understand the strategic game of litigation. In
terms of both resources and actual disputes resolved, pretrial practice is vastly more
important than actual trials. Trials are a rarity in the American civil justice sys-
tem, as the overwhelming majority of disputes are resolved via settlement. Indeed,
rational-choice scholars have struggled to explain why all disputes are not resolved
via settlement, as settlement avoids the expense of a trial, which is a dead-weight
loss to both sides of the dispute. The parties’ mutual incentive toward settlement is
only reinforced by the influence of judges, who – faced with overburdened dock-
ets – also strongly favor settlement. Consequently, understanding the dynamics of
the pretrial process and how it affects settlement is critical to understanding how
disputes are actually resolved.
Baker’s contribution to that understanding is to clarify the connections between
motion practice and settlement, in particular, the motion for summary judgment.
One motivation for this model is to explain the phenomenon of settlement offers
increasing as legal proceedings pass successive hurdles. The key takeaway from
Baker’s model is that settlement offers are a strategic means that allow defendants
to sort plaintiffs by degree of optimism. In developing his model, Baker relies on
a number of critical assumptions. Specifically, he assumes, uncontroversially, that:
(1) liability is uncertain; and (2) discovery reduces that uncertainty. More con-
testable is Baker’s assumption that plaintiffs are optimistic about recovery (and
that their degree of optimism is private information).
Based on these assumptions, Baker’s model shows that making settlement offers
subsequent to dismissal motions helps defendants sort plaintiffs by degree of op-
timism. This process facilitates dispute resolution, because plaintiffs cannot other-
wise credibly share their degree of optimism with their adversary, and defendants
will be reluctant to overpay when making settlement offers. Baker’s model also
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(2017) Toward a Theory of Motion Practice and Settlement 169
confirms the intuition that defendants are always better off with more opportunities
to dispose of cases, despite the costs of bringing the motion, because it allows them
to make investments in litigation sequentially.
In this comment, I will make some observations about Baker’s model and what
I perceive as some of its limitations, primarily its assumption of asymmetric opti-
mism. Exploring those limitations suggests possible extensions to the model based
on other forms of information asymmetry between the plaintiff and the defendant
that may be important in certain litigation contexts and have potential policy rele-
vance.
2 Observations and Extensions
2.1 Observations
One aspect of Baker’s model that raises questions for a scholar whose work fo-
cuses on litigation is the assumption that plaintiffs are optimistic – and know it –
but defendants are not.1 To begin, the plaintiff may be ignorant of her degree of
optimism. Optimism is likely the result of psychological biases, and it is very dif-
ficult for individuals to recognize their own biases. This suggests that degree of
optimism may not be asymmetric private information, because it may be unknown
to both parties.
Economic incentives, however, give reason to believe that asymmetric optimism
may not be the rule, or even the norm, in private litigation. In particular, the liveli-
hood of plaintiffs’ lawyers depends upon making accurate assessments of the like-
lihood of recovery. In the United States, most litigation on behalf of plaintiffs is
financed by the plaintiffs’ bar. Of course, these lawyers will maintain a diversified
portfolio of claimants to represent, but diversification is only a partial solution to
the financing risks created by working on a contingency fee. A plaintiffs’ lawyer
who does not do an efficient job of screening will quickly find himself driven from
the market by lawyers who screen more carefully. This is true not only because the
careful screener will waste fewer resources on weak claims, but also because the
careful screener will be able to develop a reputation with defense lawyers. A repu-
tation for only taking on strong cases affords a plaintiff’s lawyer greater credibility
in settlement negotiations.
Indeed, settlements rarely happen unless the plaintiff can make a plausible threat
to sue and to pursue the case to judgment. Unless the plaintiff makes the thresh-
old investment of filing a complaint, few defendants will settle a claim, regardless
of the merits, because they are screening plaintiffs to verify that they have the re-
sources to actually litigate a claim. If the plaintiff cannot secure a lawyer willing
to make the minimal investment required file a complaint, they are essentially ad-
mitting that they do not have the resources to litigate to judgment. But filing a
1 Baker notes in footnote 6 that these assumptions can be reversed with similar results
for his model.
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complaint will not be enough in most situations. A lawyer filing a complaint on
behalf of a plaintiff has to be able to make a plausible threat of winning the claim
at trial to extract any settlement whatsoever. Thus, plaintiffs’ lawyers working on a
contingency fee will have strong incentives to screen claims, and a similarly strong
incentive to provide their clients with unbiased predictions of the likelihood of suc-
cess. Clients are less likely to be disappointed if expectations are managed properly.
On the other side of the dispute, optimism may go unchecked because the con-
straints are more relaxed. It is quite common for defendants to feel victimized by
a lawsuit, willing to defend “on principle.” Self-serving bias likely plays a strong
role in fueling this feeling. The defendants, despite having better access to infor-
mation shedding light on the likelihood that a jury would find them to be at fault,
may view the known facts through a lens that minimizes their own culpability.
Agency costs may also play a role in encouraging self-serving assessment. Insti-
tutional defendants, such as corporations or the government, may not have a good
sense of probability of liability. This will be particularly true if one element of li-
ability is state of mind, because the institutional decision-maker(s) may not have
ready access to all of the relevant facts. The relevant minds for determining the
institution’s culpability may be lower-level officers or bureaucrats, who will have
their own incentives to minimize the impact of their actions. Even if the responsi-
ble parties are higher-ups in the organization, their ability to defend their personal
reputations with other people’s money is unlikely to promote clarity in assessing
the prospect of liability. And the lawyers representing the entity will not share the
demanding screening incentives of their adversaries on the plaintiff’s side, as they
are typically paid by the hour, rather than on a contingent basis. The defense-side
lawyers will be reluctant to push the dispute all the way to trial, for fear of incur-
ring an embarrassing loss, but a lengthy tour through extended pretrial proceedings
is definitely in their interest. Only after a summary-judgment motion has been re-
solved will the defense lawyer be forced to make an assessment of his client’s
prospects at trial with any degree of accountability.2 For all of these reasons, dis-
covery may shed light for defendants on the true probability of prevailing that they
do not have at the onset of litigation, although the marginal illumination may be
less for defendants than it is for plaintiffs. Optimism at the outset of litigation may
be a two-way street.
If optimism is probable on both sides of the dispute, the role of the judge looks
somewhat different. The judge, rather than signaling her own predilections toward
the case, may be focused on persuading both sides to the dispute to come to a more
realistic assessment of their probability of prevailing. Convergence is the goal, but
the judge’s formal role in promoting convergence is a limited one in a system that
ultimately relies on trial by jury. If the facts in the case are ultimately to be decided
by a jury, the judge’s capacity for intervention is limited to a gatekeeping role,
2 Of course, a discerning general counsel will be able to assess litigation counsel’s
earlier evaluations, but those predictions are typically so hedged by qualifiers as to be
close to unfalsifiable.
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a
Un
ive
rs
ity
 o
f M
ich
ig
an
 A
t A
nn
 A
rb
or
 1
41
.2
11
.5
7.
20
3 
Th
u,
 0
2 
No
v 
20
17
 1
8:
27
:0
6
Co
py
rig
ht
 M
oh
r S
ie
be
ck
(2017) Toward a Theory of Motion Practice and Settlement 171
screening out claims (or defenses) that are completely out of bounds for the jury to
accept. Both long-established doctrine and norms constrain the judge from signal-
ing her personal views of the merits of the claim in any reliable way. The judge is
supposed to: (1) keep an open mind; and (2) give substantial deference to the jury’s
role in fact-finding. Even after discovery has closed, the judge may not signal a
definite view on the case even at summary judgment if she is being faithful to legal
standards applied in the United States. Moreover, many judges distrust “trial by
affidavit” and may want to see actual testimony rather than excerpts of deposition
transcripts. The judge is not signaling her view of the merits of the case; instead,
the judge is signaling what range she will apply in deciding to take the case away
from the jury and award judgment to either the plaintiff or the defendant. The ques-
tion to be resolved is what conclusion a “reasonable” jury could reach based on the
evidence currently before the court. All of this means that the sorting done by the
judge at the summary-judgment stage will be a very constrained imitation of what
could potentially happen at trial. Given the constrained signal that is being sent
by the judge, for optimistic plaintiffs, intermediate rulings short of dismissal may
not dissuade them. For optimistic defendants, nothing short of a grant of summary
judgment for the plaintiff may be sufficient to debunk their optimism.
Consequently, the pretrial process of discovery may be more important in driving
both plaintiffs and defendants to a more realistic assessment of their prospects at
trial than the resolution of pretrial motions. Both sides may be ignorant of the true
facts relating to liability at the inception of the litigation, which may fuel joint –
but conflicting – optimism about their prospects. The implication for settlement
offers is that the defendant may be revealing information about his own optimism
in making the offer, while at the same time screening plaintiffs on the basis of their
optimism as they choose to accept or reject the offer.
2.2 Extensions
The possibility that optimism may be joint, rather than asymmetric, gives rise to
an interesting potential extension of Baker’s model. Baker uses the simplifying as-
sumption that there is a single fact – culpability – that the jury will ultimately be
called upon to decide. Simplifying assumptions are necessary in any theoretical
model for tractability, but this one obscures an important point: plaintiffs generally
must satisfy multiple elements in order to prevail, while defendants need to negate
only one to defeat the claim.3 For example, even a garden-variety tort claim re-
quires the plaintiff to prove duty, breach, causation, and damages. Baker assumes
that the existence of the breach is known to the defendant, which I have questioned
above, but the other elements may be equally or more accessible to the plaintiff. All
of these elements give rise to the possibility of optimism. Duty seems closest to a
pure question of law, which is presumably equally accessible to the plaintiff and de-
fendant. Other elements may be better known to the plaintiff at earlier points in the
proceedings than they are to the defendant. For example, damages are clearly better
3 As Baker notes in footnote 6.
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known to the plaintiff at the inception of the litigation, but they may be difficult to
credibly convey to the defendant at the outset of the litigation. Even causation may
have important aspects that are specific to the individual’s circumstances. Was the
plaintiff’s cancer caused by the chemical manufactured by the defendant, or the
lifestyle choices (smoking, etc.) that he has made? Plaintiffs may know aspects of
their personal history that are relevant to causation, but may be entirely unavailable
to the defendant until discovery has been completed. Even in the situation in which
the plaintiff has better access to the facts, the plaintiff (and his lawyer) may lack the
scientific understanding to know which facts of the plaintiff’s history are relevant
to the question of causation. Discovery, including expert reports, may flesh out this
understanding.
The possibility that the plaintiff may have an equal or better understanding of
some elements of his claim prior to discovery has important implications for the
timing of judicial intervention. If we treat judicial interventions as a form of de-
biasing of optimistic litigants (plaintiffs and defendants alike), then the motion to
dismiss is not simply another opportunity for the defendant to get a signal from
the judge on the likelihood that the jury will uphold the plaintiff’s claim. Instead,
we can consider it an opportunity to get an assessment of the strength of the plain-
tiff’s claim in situations where the information is equally or more accessible to
the plaintiff (and the potential for bluffing may be high). On the question of duty,
that question of law is to be decided by the judge sooner or later in the proceed-
ings, so there is no point in putting off the resolution of that uncertainty. On the
questions of causation and damages, the plaintiff’s lawyer’s obligation to make a
reasonable investigation before filing a complaint imposes some screening obliga-
tion on the lawyer. Moreover, failing in that obligation will, at least under some
circumstances, lead to sanctions being imposed by the court, thus deterring some
amount of bluffing. The combination means that uncertainty over some elements of
potential claims will be limited even before the claims are filed, which necessarily
limits the range of optimism by plaintiffs.
From a policy perspective, the question is: How stringent do we want that ini-
tial screen to be? This goes to the debate over notice pleading in complaints. If a
central purpose of pretrial proceedings is to debias litigants’ assessment of their
prospects in order to facilitate settlement, it may make sense to impose more than a
perfunctory obligation on plaintiffs to share the facts at their disposal. Fact plead-
ing, allowing those facts to be assessed by a neutral decision-maker in the form of
the judge, offers attractive efficiency advantages if we think that plaintiff optimism
is likely to be a pervasive problem. Its utility, however, is limited to those elements
likely to be most accessible to the plaintiff. If the facts are exclusively in the hands
of the defendant, requiring the plaintiff to make detailed allegations is arbitrary.
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3 Conclusion
Baker’s contribution to this symposium adds a useful component to our under-
standing of dispute resolution. Understanding the relation between optimism and
settlement offers is an important first step in understanding the strategic interaction
between plaintiff and defendant. The next step is to understand the role that mutual
optimism plays in impeding the resolution of the disputes because of the complex-
ities it adds to that strategic interaction. A better theoretical understanding of that
game would help both scholars of the litigation process and policymakers pursuing
the goal of encouraging the efficient resolution of disputes.
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